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ON PRITCHARD, OBJECTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE VALUE PROBLEM 
 
J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon 
 
ABSTRACT: Duncan Pritchard (2008, 2009, 2010, forthcoming) has argued for an elegant 
solution to what have been called the value problems for knowledge at the forefront of recent 
literature on epistemic value. As Pritchard sees it, these problems dissolve once it is 
recognized that that it is understanding-why, not knowledge, that bears the distinctive 
epistemic value often (mistakenly) attributed to knowledge. A key element of Pritchard’s 
revisionist argument is the claim that understanding-why always involves what he calls 
strong cognitive achievement—viz., cognitive achievement that consists always in either (i) 
the overcoming of a significant obstacle or  (ii) the exercise of a significant level of cognitive 
ability. After outlining Pritchard’s argument, we show (contra Pritchard) that understanding-
why does not essentially involve strong cognitive achievement. Interestingly, in the cases in 
which understanding-why is distinctively valuable, it is (we argue) only because there is 
sufficiently rich objectual understanding in the background. If that’s right, then a plausible 
revisionist solution to the value problems must be sensitive to different kinds of 
understanding and what makes them valuable, respectively. 
 
 
§1: THE VALUE PROBLEMS FOR KNOWLEDGE 
 
A key thread of thought in the recent literature on epistemic value recognizes three distinct value 
problems for knowledge—problems generated by the widely-held insight that knowledge has a 
special or distinctive epistemic value1 not shared by epistemic states that fall (even marginally) short. 
Following Pritchard (2010) here, the primary value problem is the problem of accounting for how 
knowledge is more epistemically valuable2 than mere true belief. The secondary value problem is the 
problem of accounting for how knowledge is more epistemically valuable than any proper subset of 
its parts (e.g. justified true belief that falls short of knowledge), and what he calls the tertiary value 
problem is the somewhat less-discussed problem of accounting for why we prefer (from an epistemic 
point of view) knowledge to whatever would fall just incrementally short of knowledge (for example, 
on a continuum of epistemic value). 
 Though the primary and secondary value problems have received a great deal more attention 
than the tertiary—thanks in no small part to Kvanvig’s Swamping Problem (2003)3—the tertiary 
value problem is in a sense the most important to resolve. As Pritchard puts it, solve the tertiary value 
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problem and you have, at the same time, solved the other two by extension4—a point that can be 
illustrated with reference to the following continuum: 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
        TB                                                       JTB                                              ≈K   K                    
 
Epistemic Value Continuum 
 
 Having set the stage this way, Pritchard distinguishes three broad approaches we might take 
toward the insight that generates these problems—the insight that knowledge is distinctively 
epistemically valuable. These are the validationist, revisionist and fatalist responses. The many 
epistemologists who have engaged directly with the swamping problem have typically attempted to 
validate the insight that knowledge is distinctively valuable by showing how (e.g. on their own 
theories of knowledge) knowledge can be defended as distinctively (epistemically) valuable (e.g. 
Olsson (2009), Goldman & Olsson (2009), and Greco (2010)). Fatalists, (e.g. Ridge (2010) and 
Baehr (2009)) on the other hand, argue that we don’t have to answer the value problems because the 
original insight was wrong5. On the fatalist view, neither knowledge nor any other related epistemic 
state is distinctively valuable in the way suggested by the value problems. The revisionist, however, 
agrees with the fatalist that the original insight was wrong but goes further and suggests that 
something else possesses the distinctive sort of epistemic value mistakenly attributed to knowledge.  
 Perhaps the most promising validationist approach on offer is that offered by robust virtue 
epistemology (RVE), according to which knowledge is a kind of cognitive achievement—viz., a 
cognitive success primarily creditable to the exercise of cognitive ability. Why this approach (e.g. 
Zagzebski (1996), Greco (2010, 2013), Sosa (2009) and Turri (2011)) is so promising is that it 
elegantly aims to resolve all three problems in two simple steps. First, proponents of RVE claim 
cognitive achievements, qua achievements, are finally valuable. Greco (2012) explains this claim as a 
genus-species claim: in any domain of endeavour, success through or because of ability is valuable in 
a way that lucky successes (or successes produced by, but not because of, ability) are not. Secondly, 
proponents of RVE identify knowledge with cognitive achievement. From these two claims a 
solution to the tertiary value problem follows: knowledge is more valuable than that which falls just 
incrementally short because knowledge is a cognitive achievement, and cognitive achievements (qua 
achievement) are valuable for their own sake. 
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 RVE is an especially attractive validationist strategy because (unlike, for instance, standard 
process reliabilism) it has the kind of resources to attend to the tertiary value problem, rather than 
merely the first two. Unfortunately, RVE is successful only if cognitive achievements really are 
finally valuable and knowledge can be identified with cognitive achievements. Even if the claim that 
cognitive achievement is finally valuable is granted6, this doesn’t help the validationist approach 
unless finally valuable cognitive achievements are essential to knowledge. Pritchard, in a series of 
recent works (e.g. 2010, 2011, 2012), challenges RVE on precisely this point. Specifically, he argues 
that knowledge and cognitive achievement come apart in both directions, a point he takes to be 
exhibited by cases of testimony (e.g. Lackey 2007) and barn facade cases, respectively7. If that’s 
right, then the best attempt to validate the insight that knowledge is distinctively epistemically 
valuable—namely, the proposal offered by RVE—comes up empty-handed.  
 However, the next move need not be fatalism. Notice that the observation about the final 
value of cognitive achievement suggests what a revisionist account might look like. After all, if 
cognitive achievements are finally valuable, then if there is an epistemic state in the neighbourhood 
such that cognitive achievement is essential to that state, then perhaps it’s that state (rather than 
knowledge) that is distinctively epistemically valuable. If such a state can be identified, then the 
guiding insight wasn’t entirely wrong after all—just the part about knowledge. But what would such 
a state be? 
 
§2 PRITCHARD’S REVISIONIST SOLUTION TO THE VALUE PROBLEMS  
FOR KNOWLEDGE 
 
Pritchard (e.g. 2010) urges us to consider adopting a revisionist view of epistemic value that claims 
we mistakenly thought that knowledge was distinctively valuable because understanding bears final 
value. It is a closely related epistemic state, but (as Pritchard points out), “we would surely rather 
understand than merely know” (2010: 101). We place ourselves in the camp that is sympathetic to 
this view of understanding8, though our version parts ways from Pritchard’s in some very important 
respects. 
Our critique of this attempted solution to the value problem first requires a brief foray into 
the distinctions between the three different types of understanding that are most commonly discussed 
in epistemology: 
 
Propositional understanding9: ‘I understand that X’ 
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Understanding-why10:   ‘I understand why X’ 
Objectual understanding11:  ‘I understand X’ 
 
Pritchard’s revisionist view features understanding-why, so we should take a closer look at the 
particular characterisation that he endorses. Firstly, he agrees with the popular claim that 
understanding-why is factive12—you cannot understand why X is the case if your relevant beliefs are 
false (though you may well justifiably think that you understand). Secondly, you need good 
reflectively accessible grounds in support of your understanding. Thirdly (and importantly), Pritchard 
holds that understanding-why differs from propositional knowledge in its resilience to epistemic 
luck.  
 Although Pritchard does not want to claim that understanding-why is entirely immune to 
being undermined by epistemic luck13, he holds that it is compatible with a certain type that 
undermines knowledge—environmental luck, e.g. the luck at play in barn façade cades. The 
paradigmatic case Pritchard appeals to in making this point involves someone who speaks to 
(unbeknownst to them) the one genuine fire officer in a group of liars in fancy dress, and finds out 
from this fire officer that the house burned down because of faulty wiring—suppose the fake fire 
officers would all have given a false answer. Pritchard argues that although the agent lacks 
knowledge due to the inhospitable epistemic environment, it is not obvious that he also lacks 
understanding—“after all, the agent concerned has all the true beliefs required for understanding 
why his house burned down, and also acquired this understanding in the right fashion” (2010: 108)14. 
In addition, Pritchard holds that such environmental luck cases are ones in which the relevant 
cognitive success qualifies as a cognitive achievement15. 
 Assuming that understanding-why is compatible with environmental luck, we can revisit the 
final-value-of-achievements thesis with reference to understanding-why rather than knowledge, 
because understanding-why—unlike knowledge—does not appear to come apart from cognitive 
achievement. Pritchard further supports the unity of understanding-why and cognitive achievement 
by aiming to show that there are certain cases of testimony in which knowledge is present and yet 
both understanding and cognitive achievement are lacking because “the truth of [the agent’s] belief is 
not sufficiently creditable to his cognitive ability.” (2010: 112). For example, if a young child listens 
to an explanation of the house burning down and is told that faulty wiring was the cause, his 
knowledge does not obviously constitute a cognitive achievement and (claims Pritchard) nor does he 
obviously attain understanding-why16. 
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 Crucially, though, there’s a further step to Pritchard’s revisionist argument. As he sees it, the 
value of achievements thesis depends on recognizing a more fine-grained view of cognitive 
achievements (e.g. 2010: 69): 
 
Weak cognitive achievement: Cognitive success that is because of one’s cognitive ability. 
 
Strong cognitive achievement: Cognitive success that is because of one’s cognitive ability 
where the success in question either involves the overcoming of a significant obstacle or the 
exercise of a significant level of cognitive ability17. 
 
Pritchard claims that the value of achievements thesis is implausible on the weak account, because 
some things seem too simple or passive to be finally valuable and are nonetheless successes that are 
because of ability18. So, he argues, understanding needs to be a strong cognitive achievement if we 
are to claim that understanding is finally valuable because of its connection to cognitive achievement. 
As it happens, Pritchard thinks that “the kind of cognitive achievement in play when one has 
understanding seems to explicitly be the sort at issue in the strong achievement thesis” (2010: 113), 
and he advances several points to support this suggestion. Firstly, note that one often gains 
understanding after undertaking an obstacle-overcoming effort to piece together the relevant pieces 
of information (e.g. when one tries to comprehend why someone with a complex personality has 
chosen to take some particular action). Secondly, when one gains understanding easily, it is often 
because one brings to bear significant cognitive ability (e.g. when an expert only needs a brief 
amount of time in order to grasp a complete new explanation of data relevant to their area of 
specialisation). 
If Pritchard is right that understanding-why is always a strong cognitive achievement, and if 
we accept the popular view that achievements are finally valuable, understanding-why will inherit 
the final value of achievement. This is the rough shape of Pritchard’s revisionist solution to the value 
problem. 
 
§3 OBJECTION: UNDERSTANDING-WHY WITHOUT 
 STRONG COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENT 
 
3.1 A closer look at Pritchard’s framework 
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Recall that, by Pritchard’s lights, RVE is an inadequate approach for resolving the value problems 
because, even though cognitive achievement is finally valuable, knowledge and cognitive 
achievement come apart. A similar kind of argument can be run against Pritchard’s own revisionist 
approach if it turns out that understanding-why and strong cognitive achievement come apart. 
 We will set aside the matter of whether strong cognitive achievement always involves 
understanding-why19 and turn our attention to the direction most pressing for Pritchard’s revisionism: 
the matter of whether understanding-why always involves strong cognitive achievement. Cases that 
threaten Pritchard’s proposal on this score will be ones in which an agent understands why something 
is so, whilst neither (i) overcoming a significant obstacle nor (ii) exercising any significant level of 
cognitive ability. 
 We grant that, often, understanding-why involves the piecing together of information—a 
piecing together which constitutes a kind of obstacle that the agent overcomes upon attaining 
understanding-why. We also grant that, when obstacles are overcome with little effort (in cases of 
understanding-why and more generally), the best explanation will often reference one’s possessing 
significant ability. For example, an otherwise highly difficult golf shot may be an obstacle, though no 
significant obstacle for Rory McIlroy (who performs the shot with ease), and what makes this 
otherwise difficult shot no significant obstacle is McIlroy’s significant level of skill. 
 So, there is a kind of inverse correlation at play between obstacle-overcoming and skill in 
Pritchard’s view, to the effect that the less an instance of understanding-why involves the 
overcoming of an obstacle, the more significant the ability manifested. Accordingly, on his picture, 
one who pieces together the information needed to attain understanding-why will either (i) overcome 
a significant obstacle in doing so; or (ii) if the obstacle overcome is not significant, this will be 
because she exhibits significant skill. With these assumptions in play, we can see how this view is 
well-situated to account for how understanding-why always involves strong cognitive achievement, 
as it guarantees that understanding-why will always satisfy one of the two disjuncts of his disjunctive 
account of strong cognitive achievement. 
 Notice, though, that this framework only generates the result Pritchard needs if a certain 
assumption is in place: namely, that the obstacle in question—viz., the obstacle of piecing together20 
the information relevant to acquiring understanding-why—is an obstacle not easily overcome for one 
with merely average ability. For if it were, then we couldn’t infer from the fact that one didn’t 
overcome a significant obstacle in attaining understanding-why, that, therefore, she must have 
exhibited significant skill; nor could we infer from the fact that she did not exhibit significant skill, 
that she must have thus overcome some significant obstacle.  
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 Accordingly, if the piecing together of information needed for understanding-why is akin to a 
difficult golf shot—a significant obstacle to overcome unless one has significant ability—then the 
position that understanding-why always involves strong cognitive achievement is on safe ground. 
However, in some cases, isn’t attaining understanding-why much more akin to a straightforward or 
simple shot—say, hitting a wide fairway—given that the piecing together of the relevant information 
is uncomplicated or straightforward?   
 
3.2. Problem cases 
 
In order to block the line of worry we are raising, Pritchard will need to insist that the piecing 
together of information requisite for understanding-why is, essentially, more akin to a difficult task 
than to a simple one. The grounds for such a view look shaky if it turns out that the piecing together 
of information required for understanding-why does not always involve a similar level of difficulty. 
After all, if it doesn’t, then there’s little motivation for the position that there is some level of 
difficulty involved in the piecing together of information required for understanding-why that can’t 
be overcome easily except by one with significant skill. 
There are two kinds of cases that we think press Pritchard’s position at this point. We’ll 
explore them in turn. 
 
3.2.1 Easy vs. Hard Understanding 
 
In the first problem case, let’s contrast two epistemic obstacles, each requiring piecing together of 
information in the sense Pritchard takes to be required for understanding-why. Our hero, Lauren, is 
faced with each in turn: the first obstacle consists in working out why M-Theory requires the 
postulation of 11 dimensions (no less, no more), rather than the 10 dimensions required by string 
theories. The second obstacle consists in working out why the tumble-dryer topped working. While 
only one with (at least) significant intellectual ability21 could piece together the information required 
for understanding why M-Theory requires the postulation of 11 dimensions (a significant obstacle), 
it’s plausible that by manifesting unremarkable ability, one can work out quite easily why the 
tumble-dryer stopped working in this case: it was unplugged. But if this evaluation is right, then 
clearly the piecing together of information required for understanding-why does not always involve 
the same (or even a similar) kind of obstacle. Though indeed sometimes attaining understanding-why 
will require the overcoming of a significant obstacle or the display of significant ability—as in the 
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case of working out why M-Theory requires 11 dimensions—it does not always. But if that is 
correct, then understanding-why does not essentially involve strong cognitive achievement after all.  
 Note that one wishing to maintain that strong cognitive achievement is essential to 
understanding-why might attempt to avoid the problematic commitment of counting humdrum cases 
of understanding-why as cases of strong-cognitive achievement by simply denying that these 
humdrum cases are bona fide cases of understanding-why. However, this move is not only at odds 
with our ordinary practice of understanding attributions, but it would overintellectualize 
understanding-why in a way that would commit one to denying that we have much of the ordinarily 
ascribed understanding-why we take ourselves to have. 
 
3.2.2. Shallow vs. Rich Understanding 
 
A related problem can be posed by holding fixed the explanandum. Suppose what is at issue in the 
two cases we compare is why the house burnt down. Now, let’s suppose Forrest is a wet-eared, 
novice fire officer who is not particularly bright and has only a few weeks of experience under his 
belt. He takes a look at the fire-site and quickly notices faulty wiring. “It was a no-brainer,” he says, 
testifying in an ensuing arson case. Plausibly, he counts as understanding why the house burnt down: 
after all, he is right that faulty wiring is present and, further, he is able to easily put the pieces 
together—faulty wiring was covered in the first days of his novice training. 
However, although Forrest understands why the house burnt down, there is some sense in 
which his understanding isn’t particularly rich. Past the point of remarking that faulty wiring causes 
fires, he has little to nothing illuminating to say. People with more advanced backgrounds than 
Forrest could say quite a bit more. 
Some, such as Kvanvig (2003) and Riggs (2009), contend that one way in which the 
possession of understanding differs from knowledge is that the former comes in degrees22. We are 
not taking a stand on this point. Rather, we’ll follow Riggs’s rather uncontroversial observation that 
“both the degree of explanatory coherence … as well as the amount of information present in 
someone’s understanding can vary” (2009: 7). Now, contrast the understanding possessed by Forrest, 
our novice fire officer, with that of a leading scientist who is an expert in exothermic chemical 
reactions, and who has had a team study the house’s wiring, examined photographs of the frequency 
spectrum of the flames, and conducted a detailed stoichiometric analysis of the fire site. Forrest 
understands why the house burnt down, but so does our scientist, and the explanatory coherence and 
information present in the scientist’s understanding is significantly greater than Forrest’s. 
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Understanding-why the house burnt down as the scientist does involves significant skill or the 
overcoming of a significant obstacle (or perhaps even both). But to understand, as Forrest does, why 
the house burnt down, it seems neither is required (merely, average intellectual effort and minimal 
attention during a trainee course for fire officers).  
The claim that all understanding-why involves strong cognitive achievement, then, is in 
tension with two observations about our ordinary attributions of understanding-why. The first is that, 
as in the case of Lauren, the piecing together of information that is required to understand some 
things (e.g. why M-theory requires 11 dimensions) is a significant obstacle, while the piecing 
together of information required to understand other things (e.g. why the tumble-dryer stopped 
working) is not and, as such, can be achieved by one with unremarkable ability through 
unremarkable effort. The second observation is that the explanatory coherence and information 
present in understanding why X is so can vary (sometimes significantly) between individuals who 
count as understanding why X.  
These two observations cast doubt on Pritchard’s claim that understanding-why derives value 
from being a strong cognitive achievement (though sometimes it is compresent with it). We should 
not assume, however, that this problem discredits any revisionist theory of epistemic value that 
focuses on understanding. A step in the right direction of developing a plausible revisionist approach 
to the value problem would be to identify what is present in the cases of understanding-why that are 
strong cognitive achievements. Perhaps it is what is present in these cases that actually bears the kind 
of distinctive epistemic value Pritchard mistakenly thought was present in all cases of understanding-
why. 
 
§4 SOLUTION: OBJECTUAL UNDERSTANDING 
 
We think it is clear that objectual understanding—e.g. as one attains when one grasps the 
relevant coherence-making relations between propositions comprising some subject matter—is a 
particularly valuable epistemic good. Though we needn’t rehearse these arguments23 here, consider 
that we derive satisfaction from understanding broad subject matters, we typically admire those who 
understand many subjects, and we would rather have objectual understanding than simply have a 
stack of propositional knowledge relevant to a subject matter (without the “piecing together” element 
that seems necessary for understanding).  
We have observed that understanding-why is sometimes especially epistemically valuable. 
This is the case, for instance, when understanding-why involves the grasping of a deep, elegant or 
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complex explanation. Notice, though, that in these cases, objectual understanding is invariably 
present in the background. Now, when this is the case, sometimes (and indeed, often), valuable 
objectual understanding will already be in the background when one gains understanding-why24. 
This is because, naturally, understanding a subject matter S facilitates (and, even more, often makes 
possible) the kind of S-related explanations that we grasp when understanding-why something S-
related is the case. For example, an oncology expert might come to understand why a lung cancer 
drug trial has yielded particular results by using her preexisting objectual understanding of lung 
cancer in conjunction with the finer details about the trial in order to piece together why these 
particular results were seen. Similarly, one might understand the complex explanation for why one’s 
friend has lied about his reasons for moving to a new town by using one’s background understanding 
of the friend (which includes, for example, beliefs about his past and what he wants from his life, as 
well as a grasp of the explanatory relations between his different psychological characteristics. 
In other instances, it’s plausible that individuals will come to have objectual understanding 
and understanding-why at roughly the same time. An average student might study hard and come to 
understand (at roughly the same time) a certain period of history and also why a particular war 
started during that time; or, an extremely bright individual might quickly come to understand 
Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism and also why an individual element of it explains some other 
part. Interestingly, these cases of especially valuable understanding-why also involve strong 
cognitive achievement, as it happens—they feature an obstacle not easily overcome by one of merely 
average ability, and so each agent either undertakes an obstacle-overcoming effort to piece together 
the relevant bits of information or gains understanding easily due to bringing to bear significant 
cognitive ability. 
At this point, it becomes obvious that our claim about objectual understanding should be 
refined. Thinking about when and how we value objectual understanding and understanding-why 
makes it clear that what we really endorse is the view that a certain type of objectual understanding is 
always finally valuable (and therefore capable of conferring value upon related instances of 
understanding-why). This type is rich objectual understanding, as enjoyed by agents in the above 
examples and yet (as we shall see) lacked by those featured in our counterexamples to the claim that 
understanding-why is always finally valuable. While the way in which we discussed cases of shallow 
and rich understanding in §3.2.2 is ambiguous (between understanding-why and objectual 
understanding), we think that those cases of rich understanding are best described not as instances of 
rich understanding-why but rather as instances in which understanding-why is backed by rich 
objectual understanding. Cases we might be inclined to call “rich understanding-why” are, after all, 
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cases we are able to distinguish as such only because of the valuable properties of the objectual 
understanding that will already be present. It this respect, the value of the richness of the latter has a 
kind of explanatory priority25. 
 What, then, are some plausible characteristics of rich objectual understanding? Firstly, we 
think (as suggested in §3.2.2) that it concerns wide subject matters that involve a large network of 
propositions and relations between those propositions. Understanding wider subject matters will tend 
to be more cognitively demanding than understanding narrow subject matters, because more 
propositions must be believed and their relations grasped in order for one to even attain the most 
minimal understanding26. Another characteristic of rich objectual understanding is dispositional: 
those in possession of rich understanding of a subject matter are able to answer a broader class of 
relevant questions with ease. They will, as Grimm (forthcoming: 15) puts it, “be able to see or grasp 
how changes in some of these items will lead (or fail to lead) to changes in the others.” Relevant 
what-if questions (cf. Woodward 2003), then, are answered more easily by individuals with rich 
objectual understanding, than by those who lack it.  
 In addition, those with rich objectual understanding will have a certain kind of ability that 
individuals who ceteris paribus lack rich objecutal understanding lack—viz., the ability to easily and 
accurately piece together new items of information that constitute part of the subject matter. For 
instance, one with rich objectual understanding will easily see how these new items stand in relations 
with others within the subject matter, and this is explained by the grasped network of coherence-
making relations, as well as—as Greco (2010 and Grimm (forthcoming) suggest—causal  relations, 
which facilitate the ability to provide explanations. 
Straightforward examples of obviously valuable objectual understanding all share these 
properties—for example, the cases in which agents thoroughly understand a type of cancer, a theory 
of electromagnetism, a period in history, or a complex individual. 
Consider now whether rich objectual understanding, as we’ve characterized it, is present in 
the cases of understanding-why that we suggested do not qualify as strong cognitive achievements. 
As you will recall, these are counterexamples to the claim that understanding-why always involves 
an obstacle not easily overcome for one with merely average ability. Can considerations about rich 
objectual understanding add something that further helps to explain why these cases do not seem 
distinctively valuable? 
 In the case of easy understanding, in which Lauren does not need to overcome a significant 
obstacle nor manifest a significant level of skill, note that her piecing together information to 
understand why the tumble-dryer isn’t working also does not require her to have rich objectual 
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understanding of some subject matter in the background. For example, she need not understand 
electricity, the engineering of tumble-dryers, and so on. In contrast, in the case of hard 
understanding, understanding why M-Theory requires the postulation of eleven dimensions involves 
Lauren possessing rich objectual understanding since she needs to understand the wide subject 
matters of M-Theory and string theory. With this objectual understanding in the background, her 
understanding-why seems highly valuable and must also involve overcoming a significant obstacle or 
manifesting a significant level of skill—in other words, it involves an obstacle not easily overcome 
for one of average ability.  
Meanwhile, in the case of shallow understanding, Forrest’s understanding of why the house 
burnt down is not backed by any rich objectual understanding of (for example) wiring or oxidisation. 
Further, as we previously noted, nor does it require his overcoming a significant obstacle or 
manifesting significant skill, in spite of being a genuine case of understanding. If there is any 
relevant objectual understanding in cases like Forrest’s (which is itself contentious), it is of some 
narrow subject matter that allows one to discern obvious cases of arson from those that are not, and it 
does not allow him to answer a very wide class of questions. On the other hand, the leading scientist 
who understands why the house burnt down is clearly doing something more cognitively impressive 
and has more obviously valuable understanding, but note that he also has rich objectual 
understanding of the subject matter of exothermic chemical reactions in the background. 
Considerations about objectual understanding, then, help us to make sense of why certain 
cases of understanding-why serve as counterexamples to the view that understanding-why is always 
finally valuable—these cases are also ones in which rich objectual understanding is lacking. 
Meanwhile, the cases involving what appears to be finally valuable understanding-why are cases in 
which there is rich objectual understanding in the background. On our picture, it is rich objectual 
understanding (rather than understanding-why) that has been of special value27 all along, and this is 
why instances of understanding-why with rich objectual understanding in the background are cases 
of final value. Since we can frequently find cases in which rich objectual understanding underlies 
understanding-why, this commonality elicits the mistaken intuition that all understanding-why is 
finally valuable28. 
 
§5 CONCLUSION 
 
Of course, despite what we’ve argued here, many epistemologists continue to advance validationist 
strategies with respect to the value problems. Pritchard’s critique of these approaches is a kind of 
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revisionism because he thinks the insight motivating the problems is best viewed as an insight about 
the distinctive value of understanding-why, rather than knowledge. But just as he has appealed to 
cases to show that it’s understanding-why that’s of distinctive epistemic value, not knowledge, we 
have apply a similar revisionist strategy here in showing that it is (rich) objectual understanding—
not understanding-why—that is doing the relevant work. 
 In sum, then, rich objectural understanding has a special epistemic value not shared by 
epistemic states that fall short. This much validates Kvanvig’s (2003) and Grimm’s (2010) 
suggestion that we give the epistemic state of understanding a more prominent place in 
epistemological theory. Among the research questions connected to understanding that deserve 
attention (in light of its epistemic value) are: (i) what epistemic virtues best promote the attainment 
of rich objectual understanding? (ii) in what sense is rich objectual understanding the “goal of 
inquiry”? (iii) What is the relationship between possessing rich objectual understanding and 
possessing the mixed ethical-epistemic aim of wisdom? We lack the space to explore these questions 
here. However, we recognize that, to the extent that rich objectual understanding bears a special kind 
of epistemic value, these questions (and related questions to do with understanding) belong at the 
centre of mainstream epistemology, and not at the periphery.  
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1 See Kvanvig (2003), Pritchard (2009, 2010), and [REFERENCE SUPPRESSED] for discussions of this insight. 
2 By epistemically valuable, we mean valuable in light of our epistemic ends. This general way of capturing the idea 
is not unproblematic, but the problem of spelling out the notion of epistemic value is a faced by all sides of the 
debate we’re considering, and it’s beyond our present aims to take any particular stand. More important is to 
distinguish epistemic value from other values, such as pragmatic value, aesthetic value, etc.  
3 See also Kvanvig (2008), Pritchard (2009), and Goldman & Olsson (2009). Cf. [REFERENCE SUPPRESSED] for 
a recent challenge to the legitimacy of the swamping argument.  
4 An explanation for why the epistemic value (EV) of K is greater than the epistemic value of ≈K would also be an 
explanation for why the epistemic value of knowledge exceeds that of either JTB or TB. A notorious hurdle for 
resolving either of the first two value problems has been a kind of dilemma: either epistemic value is something we 
understand as value instrumental to the end of truth (a position called epistemic value truth monism), or (ii) it’s not. 
If it is, then--as Kvanvig has pointed out--it looks like the value of truth swamps the epistemic value of other 
epistemically valuable properties we might add to true belief to get knowledge. A problem with this horn is that, 
against the background of EVTM, it becomes difficult to account for why knowledge has epistemic value exceeding 
true belief (the primary value problem), much less justified true belief (the secondary value problem) or that which 
falls just incrementally short (the tertiary value problem). The swamping worries can be avoided by rejecting 
epistemic value truth monism and replacing it with a different position of fundamental epistemic value. For a 
number of reasons, which we will not get into here, replacing epistemic value truth monism raises a nest of very 
difficult philosophical and axiological problems. But then again, so does the swamping problem. Unsurprisingly, the 
value problems have been a focus of serious worry by epistemologists who want to uphold the insight that 
knowledge is distinctively valuable.  
5 See [REFERENCE SUPPRESSED] for a recent proposal to the effect that the value problems can be resolved by 
most any JTB account with a Gettier condition. Also, note that these two forms of fatalism are very different. While 
Ridge makes use of the distinction between predicative and attributive attributions of value, Baehr takes issue 
focuses on criticising the idea that our insights about the value of knowledge are sufficient to generate a formal 
constraint on an analysis of knowledge.  
6 We assume throughout that cognitive achievements are indeed finally valuable. This popular view is well-
defended. 
7 Following Lackey (2008), Pritchard thinks ordinary cases of testimonial knowledge acquisition are cases where 
knowledge is present in the absence of any cognitive achievement on behalf of the recipient of testimonial 
knowledge. Likewise, barn facade cases show knowledge and cognitive achievement to come apart in the opposite 
direction. Pritchard’s argument is that the environmental epistemic luck that undermines knowledge in barn facade 
cases is compatible with cognitive achievements, which are present in such cases.  
8 This is a now a fairly common view in epistemology, following Kvanvig (2003). For example, see Greco (2012: 
6), who writes ‘it is widely recognized that understanding is more valuable than mere belief, and even mere 
knowledge. Thus, at least typically, we prefer understanding why something is the case over merely knowing.’ 
Similar claims can be found in Whitcomb (2010). 
9 Propositional understanding has not generated much interest, partly because even Kvanvig’s original discussion 
(2003) concedes that most apparent attributions of propositional understanding can be replaced with attributions of 
propositional knowledge without loss of meaning. See also [REFERENCE SUPPRESSED]. 
10 For additional work on understanding-why, see for example Grimm (e.g. 2010), Greco (forthcoming), Brogaard 
(2005) and Hills (2009) 
11 For more on objectual understanding, see Elgin (2009), as well as Kvanvig (2003 and 2009). 
12 For support on this point, see (for example) Riggs (2004) and Kvanvig (2003). 
13 In contrast, Kvanvig (2003) holds that understanding is entirely immune to epistemic luck. However, Pritchard’s 
revisionist line only requires at least some form of knowledge-undermining epistemic luck to leaves understanding 
untouched. 
14 We assume here that Pritchard is right that cases of environmental luck are compatible with understanding-why. 
Our criticisms focus on the claim that understanding-why is always a strong cognitive achievement. 
15 Pritchard holds this position because the agent forms a true belief using his cognitive abilities—he thinks we 
would ‘naturally say that [his] cognitive success is because of his cognitive ability and so we would, therefore, 
attribute a cognitive achievement to [him].’ (2012: 51). 
16 He also notes that understanding’s demand for reflectively accessible grounds makes it unsurprising that we can 
construct cases where these reflectively accessible grounds (and therefore understanding) are lacking and yet 
knowledge is present. 
16 
                                                                                                                                                       
17 Pritchard relies on an intuitive idea of what constitutes a significant obstacle or a significant exercise of ability, 
and we will do the same throughout (but note that more work needs to be done with regards to offering a more 
rigorous definition of what is ‘significant’ in this context). 
18 In the realm of cognitive achievement, examples include coming to have a true belief that it is dark outside just by 
looking out of the window (in normal conditions) after 10pm and forming a belief that one is in pain when 
undergoing a migraine. Even though such beliefs are the result of (very basic) cognitive abilities, they are not 
obviously the sorts of things to which we mean to refer when we talk of achievements. Strong cognitive 
achievement’s demand for significant ability or the overcoming of a significant obstacle attempts to rule out easy, 
passive and transparent types of cases. See Pritchard (2010: 99) for more on why passive beliefs are not a problem 
for the strong cognitive achievement thesis no matter how they are more precisely understood. In addition, note that 
Pritchard’s claim focuses on prima facie value, so that the value of some particular achievements might be judged to 
be negligible, non-existent or negative (e.g. trivial achievements such as successfully counting the number of blades 
of grass on a lawn, or evil achievements such as successfully committing genocide). We will not challenge 
Pritchard’s arguments against the value of weak cognitive achievement here. 
19 We suspect this is not the case, as at least some instances of knowledge plausibly constitute strong cognitive 
achievement.  
20 This is the way Pritchard himself refers to the activity characteristic of attaining understanding-why, wherein one 
grasps an explanation. 
21 For a flavour of some of the mathematical background that would be required to understand M-Theory (and why 
it requires 11 dimensions), see Dijkgraaf (2000): http://www.mathematik.uni-
bielefeld.de/~rehmann/ECM/cdrom/3ecm/pdfs/pant3/dijkgr.pdf 
22 Note that Kvanvig and Riggs seem to have objectual understanding in mind when noting that understanding 
comes in degrees. We will remain neutral on the matter of whether understanding-why comes in degrees. 
23 See, especially, Kvanvig (2003; 2012). 
24 For example, an oncology expert might come to understand why a lung cancer drug trial has yielded particular 
results by using her preexisting objectual understanding of lung cancer in conjunction with the finer details about the 
trial in order to piece together why these particular results were seen. Similarly, one might understand the complex 
explanation for why one’s friend has lied about his reasons for moving to a new town by using one’s background 
understanding of the friend (which includes, for example, beliefs about his past and what he wants from his life, as 
well as a grasp of the explanatory relations between his different psychological characteristics). 
25 We thank John Greco for pressing this point. 
26 However, the other likely characteristics of rich objectual understanding suggest that basic understanding of a 
wide subject matter need not in itself be enough for rich objectual understanding to obtain. 
27 Our view is clearly compatible with rich objectual understanding’s value being explained by its always being a 
strong cognitive achievement, and we think it highly plausible that attaining rich objectual understanding always 
involves either a manifestation of significant ability or the overcoming of a significant obstacle. However, we are 
also open to any plausible alternative explanations of rich objectual understanding’s value. For example, the element 
of rich understanding that requires being able to easily see how new pieces of information stand in coherence 
relations with the subject matter may provide a further way to explain its value (i.e. in terms of its provision of 
expedient acquisition of information into the coherent picture. 
28 Since our view is that not all objectual understanding is valuable, it might be tempting for an opponent to press 
the line that there’s a special subset of understanding-why that is finally valuable in virtue of always being a strong 
cognitive achievement. Perhaps it could be called rich understanding-wh, and its value could be explained in terms 
of always involving a significant obstacle or a significant exercise of skill. However, this objection runs into 
difficulty when it turns out that what makes rich understanding have the value that is does (either in connection with 
strong cognitive achievement or something else) turns out to be features that are distinct to a type of objectual 
understanding and are only present when that understanding is present. 
